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Abstract
In public procurement auctions, governments occasionally offer preferences to qualified firms in the
form of bid discounts. Previous studies on bid discounts do not account for affiliation – a particular form
of cost dependence that is likely to occur in a public procurement setting. Utilizing data from the New
Mexico Department of Transportation’s Resident Preference Program, this paper addresses that issue
via an empirical model of firm bidding and entry behavior that allows for affiliation and bid discounting.
I find evidence that firms have affiliated project-completion costs and show how this type of affiliation
changes preference auction outcomes.
1 Introduction
Procurement auctions are widely used by governments as a means of securing goods and services for the lowest
possible price. Internationally, government procurement accounts for anywhere from 10 to 25 percent of GDP,
and in the Unites States alone, government spending on goods and services accounted for 15.2 percent of GDP
in 2013, totaling $2.55 trillion.1 In these procurement auctions, governments occasionally offer preferential
treatment to a certain subset of bidders. This treatment often takes the form of bid discounting – a policy
where the government will lower the bids of preferred bidders for comparison purposes and pay the full asking
price conditional on winning. These preferential policies can affect auction outcomes and have been studied
extensively in the literature.2
∗I would like to thank Katja Seim for her guidance and support throughout this project. I also would like to thank Petra
Todd and Holger Seig for their comments as well as participants in empirical micro lunch seminar and topics in empirical micro
seminar. Finally, I thank Patricia Silva and David Coriz for providing parts of the raw data.
1These numbers are taken from the World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files.
2See Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), Marion (2007), and Hubbard and Paarsch (2009) for papers discussing bid discounting.
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The purpose of offering many of these preference programs is to encourage the participation of a particular
type of bidder. For example, California offers a bid discount to small businesses to encourage these business
to bid on larger projects, and the Inter-American Development Bank offers a bid discount to domestic firms
to encourage domestic development. The total effect of these programs, however, has been shown to be
ambiguous. Although offering bid discounts can encourage preferred bidders to bid less aggressively, bid
discounts also encourage non-preferred bidders to bid more aggressively and can increase competition and
discourage preferred participation. This type of trade-off is highlighted in McAfee and McMillan (1989) where
the authors show that the government can minimize procurement costs by choosing an optimal discount level
when participation is fixed and in Corns and Schotter (1999) where the authors use experiments to show
that preferences can lead to increases in both cost effectiveness and the representation of preferred bidders.3
Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011) show that these effects are altered when participation is endogenous.
Another potential issue in evaluating these programs is the possibility of dependence between the project-
completion costs of bidders. These costs are private information and are typically taken to be independent,
implying that a firm that learns her own cost has no additional information on the costs of other bidders.
There are a number of reasons why this independence assumption may not hold. For instance, firms may use
the same subcontractors when submitting a bid, so firms sharing subcontractors should have some form of
dependence in their private information. Firms may also buy raw materials from the same suppliers which
again implies some dependence in project-completion costs, especially if firms are located near each other.
In fact, 30 percent of items4 on construction projects qualifying for bid preferences had at least two firms
bid the same amount in the data. This statistic is indicative of cost symmetries across firms and can be
problematic if costs are taken to be independent.5
This paper contributes to the bid preference literature by allowing firms to have affiliated private project-
completion costs in procurement auctions with bid discounting and endogenous entry.6 Affiliation is a stronger
notion of positive correlation, and it captures the idea that firm project-completion costs may be related to
each other. Using copula methods developed by Hubbard, Li, and Paarsch (2012) and extended by Li and
3Additional studies that show the theoretical implications of granting preference to certain groups of bidders include Vagstad
(1995) who extends the analysis of McAfee and McMillan (1989) to incentive contracts and Naegelen and Mougeot (1998) who
extend the analysis of McAfee and McMillan (1989) to include objectives concerning the distribution of contracts over preferred
and non-preferred bidders.
4Items are portions of a construction project. The final bid is calculated as the sum of the bids on each item.
5Correlations across bids can also be generated by unobserved project heterogeneity (project characteristics that are unob-
served to the econometrician yet observed by all bidders). Section 6.2 presents evidence that supports the notion that affiliation
outweighs unobserved project heterogeneity in this empirical setting. In other environments where unobserved auction hetero-
geneity dominates affiliation, econometric methods developed in Krasnokutskaya (2011) and empirical methods found in Hong
and Shum (2002) and Haile et al. (2006) would be more suitable. Balat (2016) discusses identification in environments with
both affiliation and unobserved project heterogeneity.
6This paper also complements the existing literature on auctions with endogenous entry. These papers include Athey et al.
(2011),Li (2005) and Bajari and Hortacsu (2003)
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Zhang (2013), this paper shows how affiliation and bid preference can jointly affect procurement auctions,
and to my knowledge, this is the first paper to empirically do so.
In order to evaluate the impact of affiliation and bid preferences on procurement auctions, this paper
uses data from New Mexico Department of Transportation (NMDOT) highway construction contracts. New
Mexico is one of the few states that offers qualified resident firms a 5 percent bid discount on state-funded
projects. Affiliation is plausible in this setting; firms located closely to each other are more likely to buy from
the same suppliers and use similar subcontractors, potentially generating dependence in project-completion
costs.
To then determine the extent to which affiliation is present in NMDOT highway construction contracts,
compare outcomes under affiliation and independence, and investigate alternative discount levels, an empirical
model of bidding and endogenous entry is estimated using the data. The estimates confirm that firms do
have affiliated project-completion costs and that removing this affiliation causes firms to behave differently.
In particular, affiliation lowers firm incentives to participate, resulting in higher overall procurement costs.
Counterfactual auctions using alternative discount levels show that New Mexico’s current program accounts
for a 1.8 percent increase in procurement costs, while an increase in procurement costs of 6 percent is
generated by affiliation. The results highlight the influence of affiliation in public procurement auctions.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives the details of the New Mexico procurement
process and describes the data. Section 3 provides a definition of affiliation, and section 4 presents the
theoretical framework by which the effect of affiliation on bidding and entry behavior is analyzed. Section
5 shows how the theoretical model is estimated. Section 6 presents the empirical findings, while section 7
contains the counterfactual policy analysis. Section 8 concludes.
2 New Mexico’s Highway Procurement Market and Data
This section describes the process by which the NMDOT awards their highway construction contracts and the
data collected for the empirical portion of this paper. The sample contains 376 highway construction contracts
awarded by the NMDOT between 2010 and 2014 for the maintenance and construction of transportation
systems. Preferences are applied to resident firms on state-funded projects. Over the sample period, there
are a total 23 of these state-funded contracts while the remaining 353 projects are federally assisted projects.
An immediate limitation of the New Mexico data is that there are a relatively small number of preference
projects. In response to this limitation, much of the analysis relies on the empirical model of entry and
bidding outlined in section 5. The empirical model allows for information in both the preference and non-
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preference auctions to be used in identifying the model primitives while accounting for strategic behavior
attributed to bid discounting.
2.1 Letting
Four weeks prior to the date of bid opening, the NMDOT advertises construction projects estimated to cost
more than $60, 000. The Contracts Unit is responsible for gathering the necessary contract documents used
during this advertisement phase. Each document is unique to the work required on each project and contains
details such as the location of the project, the nature of the work, the number of working days to complete the
project, and the length of the project. These details are summarized in an “Invitation for Bids” document
and are included in the set of project-specific covariates.
Another feature of advertising is providing a rough approximation of firms who could potentially bid for a
contract. To advertise potential competitors, the NMDOT publishes a list of “planholders” ten days prior to
bid opening. Status as a planholder requires that the firms provide some documented evidence that they have
the contract documents either directly through the NMDOT or through written communication.7 Moreover,
failure to seek planholder status results in the bid becoming unresponsive and subsequently rejected. Given
that the list of planholders is known prior to bidding and planholder status is required to submit a valid bid,
the firms who are registered as planholders are used as a measure of the set of potential bidders.8
In awarding these construction projects, the NMDOT uses a competitive first-price sealed-bid procurement
auction format. Potential firms who decide to bid on a project submit bids in a sealed envelope or secure
online submission website to the NMDOT. The firm with the lowest bid (usually) wins the contract, and
the state pays the winner their bid. The submitted bids as well as an engineer’s estimate are tabulated and
published by the NMDOT in an Apparent Low Bids document directly after bid opening. The bids and
estimates in these documents are used as the bids and estimates received by the NMDOT for each project.
2.2 Resident Preference Program
New Mexico offers bid preference to qualified resident firms on construction projects using state funds. The
preference is implemented through a 5 percent discount on bids, which lowers resident bids by 5 percent
7For more information the planholder requirement, see the NMDOT website.
8This measure is not perfect. Some firms seek planholder status after the list is published, resulting in a larger set of potential
bidders than what is represented on the planholder document. To account for this difference, any actual bidders that do not
appear in the planholder document are included in the set of potential entrants. Moreover, the set of planholders may contain
firms that do not have the means to bid as a main contractor. In order to get a more accurate representation of the set of firms
who could potentially bid, firms who are unsuccessful in submitting a valid bid during the sample period are not included as
planholders.
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in evaluation and pays the full asking price conditional on winning. To illustrate, suppose two bidders
are bidding for a contract and the resident contractor bids $1, 000, 000 and the out-of-state contractor bids
$975, 000. After applying the five percent discount to the resident contractor, her bid is lowered to $950, 000,
she wins the contract, and the state pays her $1, 000, 000.
To qualify for resident preference, firms must meet a certain list of conditions. In particular, firms must
have paid property taxes on real property owned in the state of New Mexico for at least five years prior to
approval and employ at least 80 percent of its workforce from the state of New Mexico. There are also a
number of penalties in place to prevent firms from exploiting residency status. Providing false information
to the state of New Mexico in order to qualify as a resident results in automatic removal of any preferences,
ineligibility to apply for any more preference for at least five years, and administrative fines of up to $50, 000
for each violation. A list of qualified resident firms is obtained through the New Mexico Inspection of Public
Records Act, which allows anyone to view public documents. Out of the 110 different firms observed in the
data, 66 firms are residents while the remaining 44 firms are non-residents. Resident firms account for 80
percent of planholders and 72 percent of submitted bids.
3 Affiliation
The possibility of cost dependence across firms is modeled through affiliation. First introduced into auctions
by Milgrom and Weber (1982), affiliation is a concept and can arise as a result of shared subcontractors and
suppliers. Theoretically, affiliation describes the relationship between two or more random variables; if two or
more random variables are affiliated, then they exhibit some form of positive dependence. de Castro (2010)
shows that affiliation is a sufficient condition for positive correlation, so affiliation can roughly be interpreted
as a stronger form of positive correlation.9 Formally, affiliation is defined as follows:
Definition. The density function f : [c, c]
n → R+ is affiliated if f (c) f (c′) ≤ f (c ∧ c′) f (c ∨ c′), where
c ∧ c′ = (min {c1, c′1} , ...,min {cn, c′n}) and c ∨ c′ = (max {c1, c′1} , ...,max {cn, c′n}).
In a procurement setting, affiliation in project-completion costs means that when a firm draws a high
project-completion cost, it is more likely that competing firms also have drawn high project-completion costs.
9See de Castro (2010) for a detailed discussion on the relationship between affiliation and other notions of positive dependence.
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4 Theoretical Model
This section provides the theoretical foundation by which the market for NMDOT construction contracts is
analyzed. In order to preserve the main institutional features, New Mexico’s market for highway construc-
tion contracts is modeled as a first-price sealed-bid procurement auction with asymmetric bidders, affiliated
private values, and endogenous entry. The model proceeds in two stages as in Levin and Smith (1994),
Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), and Li and Zhang (2013). In the first stage, potential resident and non-
resident bidders decide whether to pay the entry cost and participate in the auction. Bidders will enter if
their expected profits from participation exceed their cost of preparing a bid. The entry stage captures the
effort required to gather information about the project and the opportunity cost of time which, in the New
Mexico setting, is analogous to reading the invitation for bids and requesting project information. In the
second stage, bidders are informed of the identity and number of actual competitors, draw their project-
completion costs from an affiliated distribution, and submit a bid for the project. Note that affiliation in
project-completion cost gives bidders extra information on the opponent’s project-completion costs, which is
plausible if bidders are located close to each other and share similar subcontractors.
4.1 Environment
Formally, NR potential resident bidders and NNR potential non-resident bidders compete in a first-price
sealed-bid procurement auction for the completion of one indivisible construction project. Resident and
non-resident bidders are risk neutral and draw bid-preparation costs, ki, independently from the distribution
Gmk (·) where m ∈ {R,NR} denotes firm i’s group affiliation. Project-completion costs, ci, are drawn from
the joint distribution Fc(·, . . . , ·) with support [c, c]n where n is the total number of actual bidders. Project-
completion cost distributions can be affiliated, but project-completion costs are assumed to be independent
of bid-preparation costs.10 These distributions are common knowledge to every potential bidder.
Additionally, resident firms in auctions that use state funds receive a discount of δ on their submitted
bid. In terms of the model, the auctioneer will lower every resident bid by a factor of (1− δ) when comparing
it against a non-resident bid in a preference auction, so a resident will win if her bid is less than the lowest
competing resident bid and the lowest competing non-resident bid scaled by a factor of 11−δ . The value of
the discount is 5 percent for New Mexico residents.
10This assumption implies that bidders do not base entry decisions on their realized project-completion costs. Samuleson
(1985) discusses the opposite case where bidders are completely informed of their project-completion costs prior to entry, and
Roberts and Sweeting (2010) discuss the intermediate case where bidders are partially informed. Within the independent private
values paradigm, Li and Zheng (2009) provide evidence that supports a model in which bidders are initially uniformed prior to
entry in a procurement setting.
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4.2 Bidding
After bidders learn of their project-completion costs and the number of actual entrants, bidders submit their
bids to complete the construction contract. Heterogeneity in residency status along with bid discounting
leads to group-symmetric equilibria as in Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011) where bidders of each group m
follow potentially different monotone and differentiable bid functions βm(·) : [c, c] → R+. In particular, a
bidder of group m solves the following optimization problem to determine the equilibrium bids:
pi(ci;nNR, nR) = max
bi
(bi − ci) Pr
(
(1− δ)DR bi < Bj ∀j ∈ NR, (1− δ)−DNR bi < Bl ∀l ∈ R | ci
)
where pi(ci;nNR, nR) is the value function, bi is the bid choice of bidder i, Bj and Bl are the competing
bids, Dm is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if firm i is associated with group m and
zero otherwise, and δ = 0 if the auction is not a preference auction. The objective function illustrates how
firms view preference when submitting a bid. For positive δ, preference increases the probability of a resident
beating a non-resident bidder without requiring the resident bidder to submit a lower bid. Residents therefore
have a higher probability of winning a preference auction with the same choice of bi when compared to a
non-preference auction yet face the same payment if they win.11
Let nm denote the actual number of bidders in group m. Furthermore, let F¯c−i(c1, . . . , ci−1, ci+1, . . . , cn |
ci) = Pr (C1 > c1, . . . , Ci−1 > ci−1, Ci+1 > ci+1, . . . , Cn > cn | ci) be the joint survival function of project-
completion cost signals without bidder i conditional on bidder i’s signal,12 and define β−1NR
(
(1− δ)DR bi
)
=(
β−1NR
(
(1− δ)DR bi
)
, . . . , β−1NR
(
(1− δ)DR bi
))
∈ RnNR−DNR as a vector that collects the inverse bid func-
tions of non-residents and β−1R
(
(1− δ)−DNR bi
)
=
(
β−1R
(
(1− δ)−DNR bi
)
, . . . , β−1R
(
(1− δ)−DNR bi
))
∈
RnR−DR as a vector that collect the inverse bid function of residents. The first order condition that charac-
11This intuition assumes that all else (opposing bids, object being auctioned, etc.) is equal.
12See section 5.1 for a detailed description on how to write the conditional survival function in terms of the cumulative density
function
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terizes the optimal bid is then given by
0 = (bi − ci)
×
[
nNR−DNR∑
j=1
F¯c−i,j
(
β−1NR
(
(1− δ)DR bi
)
,β−1R
(
(1− δ)−DNR bi
)
| ci
)
× β−1NR,1
(
(1− δ)DR bi
)
(1− δ)DR
+
n−1∑
j=nNR−DNR+1
F¯c−i,j
(
β−1NR
(
(1− δ)DR bi
)
,β−1R
(
(1− δ)−DNR bi
)
| ci
)
× β−1R,1
(
(1− δ)−DNR bi
)
(1− δ)−DNR
]
+ F¯c−i
(
β−1NR
(
(1− δ)DR bi
)
,β−1R
(
(1− δ)−DNR bi
)
| ci
)
where F¯c−i,j (·, . . . , · | ci) is the partial derivative of the conditional survival function with respect to the
j’th coordinate, β−1NR,1 (·) is the partial derivative of a non-resident’s inverse bid function with respect to its
first coordinate, and β−1R,1 (·) is the partial derivative of a resident’s inverse bid function with respect to its
first coordinate. These first order conditions form a system of differential equations that characterize the
equilibrium bids.
Affiliation and bid preferences both have implications for equilibrium bidding in the second stage. Affilia-
tion affects how aggressively bidders bid given their cost realization. Indeed, a bidder who draws a low (high)
cost when costs are affiliated would be less (more) willing to bid higher than if costs were independent since
affiliation makes it more likely that competing bidders have also drawn low (high) costs. Bid preferences
drives a wedge between resident and non-resident bidders in the sense that residents will bid less aggressively
than non-residents to account for the fact that residents have their bids discounted, and this wedge is am-
plified when costs are affiliated.13 The interaction of these two forces determine the outcome of a preference
auction.
A complete characterization of the bidding equilibrium requires a specification of boundary conditions.
Following Hubbard and Paarsch (2009) and Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), four group specific boundary
conditions are imposed.
13These effects hold under intermediate levels of affiliation relevant to this empirical setting. Numerical simulations reveal
that bidders behave differently under more extreme forms of affiliation. In particular, bidders will know that their competitors
have costs very similar to their own and will bid close to their cost for any cost draw.
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4.2.1 Left Boundary Condition
The left boundary condition requires that bidders who draw the lowest project-completion cost submit the
same bid when bid preferences are taken into account. Therefore, the left boundary condition for resident
bidders is as follows:
β−1R
(
b
(1− δ)
)
= c.
Likewise, the left boundary condition for non-resident bidders is
β−1NR (b) = c
where b is the common low bid.
4.2.2 Right Boundary Condition
The right boundary condition restricts bidding behavior at the highest possible project-completion cost draw.
This condition can loosely be interpreted as bidders who draw the highest project-completion cost bid their
project-completion costs while making any necessary adjustments for the group affiliation of the competing
bidders. The right boundary condition for resident bidders is formally
β−1R
(
b
)
= c
where b = c if nR > 1 and b = arg maxb [(b− c) Pr ((1− δ) b < bj ∀j ∈ NR | c)] if nR = 1. That is to say,
if there is only one resident bidder on a project, she will choose a bid that maximizes her expected profits
since the discount may lower her bid enough to be competitive with the non-resident bidders. The right
boundary condition for non-resident bidders is
β−1NR (c) = c.
Observe that bid preference introduces another equilibrium feature mentioned by Hubbard and Paarsch
(2009) and Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011). In particular, if a non-resident draws a project-completion cost
c ∈ [(1− δ) b, c], then she also bids her project-completion cost. Note that a project-completion cost draw in
this region for a non resident will never win the auction, yielding a payoff of zero as long as the non-resident
bidder does not bid below her cost. Since bidders are indifferent between not winning an auction and winning
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an auction with a bid equal to their cost, this assumption can be made without changing the equilibrium
payoffs.
Existence and uniqueness of a bidding equilibrium is key in empirically implementing these types of
auctions. Existence establishes that there is, in fact, a solution to the auction, while uniqueness establishes
that the bidders are playing one equilibrium as opposed to potentially multiple different equilibria. Reny
and Zamir (2004) show that a monotone pure strategy equilibrium exists in a more general setting than this
type of auction. Uniqueness follows from Theorem 1 in Lebrun (2006) once addition structure is imposed on
the conditional survival function.14
4.3 Entry
In the entry stage, firms make participation decisions based on their knowledge of the number of potential
entrants of each group, their knowledge of their own entry cost ki and their knowledge of the distributions
of project-completion costs and bid-preparation costs. Ex ante expected profits are calculated as
Πm (Nm, N−m) =
∑
nm−1⊆Nm,n−m⊆N−m
∫ c
c
pi (ci;nm, n−m) dFmc (ci) Pr (nm − 1, n−m | Nm, N−m)
where the −m subscript indicates the bidders not affiliated with the group of bidder i and Fmc (·) is
the marginal project-completion cost distribution of group m.15 These profits are only a function of the
observed number of potential bidders since the number of potential bidders and the bid-preparation cost are
the only payoff relevant information available before entry. Also note that the subscript is group specific
since members of the same group face the same ex-ante expected profits. The group specific equilibrium
entry probabilities pm are determined by the known entry cost distribution. That is
pm = Pr (ki < Πm) = G
m
k (Πm)
where Gmk (·) is the marginal distribution of bid-preparation costs for a bidder in group m, and the above
equality is formed using the equilibrium assumption of belief consistency. Existence of threshold probabilities
pm that satisfy the above equation are guaranteed through an application of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem.
16
14In particular, the conditional survival function must be log concave. This structure is assumed in section 5.1
15When computing these profits, there is a case where no competing bidders enter the auction. This case is problematic since
the NMDOT does not explicitly post a reserve price. The NMDOT does, however, reserve the right to reject all bids if the lowest
price is excessively high. To capture this power to reject bids, this paper follow Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011) in assuming
that firms compete against the government (represented by a resident bidder) when faced with no other competition.
16Uniqueness, however, is not guaranteed and must be verified through simulation.
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5 Empirical Model and Estimation
While the theoretical model provides a foundation for understanding the market for NMDOT procurement
contracts, it does not lend itself to estimation without further distributional assumptions. This section out-
lines those distributional assumptions needed to produce an empirical model that can be estimated from the
data. First, methods in modeling affiliation using copulas are discussed. Next, the remaining distributional
assumptions and estimation routine are specified. A discussion of how affiliation is parametrically identified
through the estimation procedure is included at the end of this section.
5.1 Copula Representation
One difficulty in implementing empirical auction models with affiliation is dealing with the joint cost distri-
bution. To overcome this difficulty, the empirical model relies on copula methods as developed by Hubbard,
Li, and Paarsch (2012). Copulas are an expression of the joint distribution of random variables as a function
of the marginals. Formally, if c1, c2, . . . , cn are n possibly correlated random variables with marginal distri-
butions F 1c (c1), F
2
c (c2), . . . , F
n
c (cn) respectively, then the joint distribution can be written as a function of
the marginal distributions as
Fc (c1, c2, . . . , cn) = C
[
F 1c (c1) , F
2
c (c2) , . . . , F
n
c (cn)
]
where C [·, . . . , ·] is the copula function.
The particular type of copula used to represent the joint cost distribution of resident and non-resident
bidders is a Clayton copula. This type of copula has the following closed-form representation:
C
[
F 1c (c1) , F
2
c (c2) , . . . , F
n
c (cn)
]
=
(
n∑
i=1
F ic (ci)
−θ − n+ 1
)− 1θ
where θ ∈ [−1,∞) \ {0} is the dependence parameter. Besides having a tractable representation, Clayton
copulas are useful in the sense that affiliation only requires θ to be greater than zero.17 Moreover, θ has
the nice interpretation that a higher value of θ implies a higher degree of affiliation between the random
variables, so θ contains all of the relevant information on cost dependence.
Since this paper focuses on procurement auctions, the conditional survival function is the distribution
of interest. Two results from Hubbard, Li, and Paarsch (2012) are used to construct an expression for the
17For a formal proof of this statement, see Muller and Scarsini (2005)
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conditional survival function using copulas:
Result 1:
The survival function, F¯c(c1, c2, . . . , cn), can be written as
F¯c(c1, c2, . . . , cn) = Pr(C1 > c1, C2 > c2 . . . , Cn > cn)
= 1−
n∑
i=1
Pr(Ci < ci) +
∑
1≤i<j≤n
Pr(Ci < ci, Cj < cj)
− · · ·+ (−1)n Pr(C1 < c1, C2 < c2 . . . , Cn < cn).
This result provides an expression of the survival function in terms of the cumulative density function
(CDF) which has a copula representation. Let S
[
1− F 1c (c1) , 1− F 2c (c2) , . . . , 1− Fnc (cn)
]
denote the sur-
vival copula evaluated at the survival marginals. The first result shows that the survival copula can be
expressed as follows:
S
[
1− F 1c (c1) , 1− F 2c (c2) , . . . , 1− Fnc (cn)
]
= 1−
n∑
i=1
C
[
F ic (ci)
]
+
∑
1≤i<j≤n
C
[
F ic (ci) , F
j
c (cj)
]
− · · ·+ (−1)nC [F 1c (c1) , . . . , Fnc (cn)] .
Result 2:
Pr(C2 > c2 . . . , Cn > cn | c1) = S1
[
1− F 1c (c1) , 1− F 2c (c2) , . . . , 1− Fnc (cn)
]
where S1 [·, . . . , ·] is the
partial derivative of the survival copula with respect to the first coordinate.
Result 2 shows that the conditional survival copula is equivalent to the partial derivative of the full
survival copula with respect to the conditioning argument.
Given these two results, the second stage profits of bidder 1 can be rewritten using copulas as
pi(c1;nNR, nR) = max
b1
(b1 − c1)
× S1
[
1− Fm1c (c1) , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, . . . , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)
, . . . , 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)]
wherem1 is the group affiliation of bidder 1, β
−1
NR = β
−1
NR
(
(1− δ)DR b1
)
, and β−1R = β
−1
R
(
(1− δ)−DNR b1
)
.
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The first order conditions are now given by
S1
[
1− Fm1c (c1) , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, . . . , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)
, . . . , 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)]
= (b1 − c1)
[
(nNR −DNR)β−1NR,1 (1− δ)DR fNRc
(
β−1NR
)
(1)
×S12
[
1− Fm1c (c1) , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, . . . , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)
, . . . , 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)]
+ (nR −DR)β−1R,1 (1− δ)−DNR fRc
(
β−1R
)
×S1n
[
1− Fm1c (c1) , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, . . . , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)
, . . . , 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)] ]
where fmc (·) is the marginal probability density function (PDF) associated with the marginal CDF Fmc (·).
5.2 Parametric Specifications
The size of the data requires that a parametric approach be taken in estimating the theoretical model.
For this purpose, an auction, indexed by w, is taken to be characterized by the vector of observables
(xw, zw, nRw, nNRw, NRw, NNRw) where xw is a vector of auction-level observables that affect project-
completion costs, zw is a vector of auction-level observables that affect bid-preparation costs, nRw and
nNRw are the observed number of resident and non-resident entrants respectively and NRw and NNRw are
the advertised number of potential resident entrants and non-resident entrants respectively. The group-
specific marginal distributions of project-completion costs conditional on xw are given by F
m
c (· | xw), and
the group-specific marginal distribution of bid-preparation costs conditional on zw are given by G
m
k (· | zw).
Parametric assumptions on the probability firms assign to the entry of competing firms are required to
address entry. To this end, entry probabilities pmw (xw, zw, NRw, NNRw) are taken to be characterized by a
binomial distribution:
Pr (nRw, nNRw | xw, zw, NRw, NNRw) = Pr (nRw | xw, zw, NRw, NNRw)× Pr (nNRw | xw, zw, NRw, NNRw)
where
Pr (nmw | xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw) =
 Nmw
nmw
 (pmw)nmw (1− pmw)Nmw−nmw
and
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pmw = G
m
k (Πmw (xw, Nmw, N−mw) | zw) . (2)
This assumption on entry probabilities means that each firm calculates the probability that firms in their
group and firms in their competing group enter the auction given their knowledge of the project-completion
and entry cost distributions. Observe that equation 2 comes from the equilibrium condition that beliefs are
consistent.
A complication that arises in empirically implementing the theoretical model is the presence of the inverse
bid function in the first order conditions of the second-stage bidding problem. This complication requires
that the inverse bid function be approximated for every set of second-stage parameter guesses. To address
that issue, this paper relies on approximations based on indirect methods introduced by (Guerre, Perrigne,
and Vuong, 2000, henceforth abbreviated GPV) further extended by Krasnokutskaya (2011) for the case
of unobserved auction heterogeneity and Hubbard, Li, and Paarsch (2012) for the case of affiliation using
copulas. In particular, a firm’s cost can be inferred from the observed bid distribution by noting that
Fmb (b) = F
m
c
(
β−1m (b)
)
and fmb (b) = f
m
c
(
β−1m (b)
)
β−1m,1 (b).
18 Making these substitutions in the first order
conditions of the second stage bidding problem obviates the need for estimating the inverse bid function
when determining project-completion costs. As a result, the empirical model will now focus on the marginal
distribution of bids, Fmb (· | xw), instead of the marginal distribution of project-completion costs, Fmc (· | xw).
The final set of distributional assumptions are placed on the distribution of bids and bid-preparation
costs. In order to have positive bids and allow for affiliation, the log of the submitted bids is modeled as
follows:
log (biw) = x
′
iwβ + 
mi
iw
where
miiw | xiw ∼ N
(
0, exp (x′iwσ)
2
)
(
NR1w , . . . , 
NR
nNRw, 
R
nNR+1w, . . . , 
R
nNR+nRw | xiw
)
≡ w ∼ Fw
Fw = C
[
FNR1w , . . . , FNRnNRw
, FRnNR+1
, . . . , FRnNR+nR
]
.
Likewise, the bid-preparation costs are assumed to take the following form:
18For a complete description on how to approximate the inverse bid functions using GPV (2000) in this setting, see the
appendix.
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log (kiw) = z
′
iwγ + u
mi
iw
where
umiw | ziw ∼ N
(
0, exp (z′iwα)
2
)
.
5.3 Estimation
The parameters of the empirical model are estimated using a generalized method of moments (GMM) ap-
proach. The theoretical predictions of the empirical model are essentially matched to the data by selecting
the parameter values that minimize the weighted distance between model moments and data moments. This
subsection gives a general overview of how the moment conditions are constructed and used in estimation.
For a more detailed explanation on how the moments are derived from the empirical model, see the appendix.
The first set of moment conditions are used to identify the parameters of the bid distribution. These
moment conditions are
E [xiw (log (biw)− x′iwβ)] = 0 (3)
and
E [xiw (log (biw)− x′iwβ) (log (biw)− x′iwβ)] = E
[
xiw exp (x
′
iwσ)
2
]
. (4)
Observe that equation 4 yields the standard deviation parameter, σ, and equations 3 and 4 yield the
mean parameter, β.
In addition to identifying the parameters of the marginal distributions, the affiliation parameter, θ, must
also be identified through the moment conditions of the model. This parameter is estimated by relying on
methods developed by Oh and Patton (2013) to estimate copulas using method of moments. In particular,
the degree of dependence between two random variables can be summarized by a statistic called Kendall’s
tau. This statistic’s equation for Clayton copulas together with its closed form solution motivate the following
moment condition:
θ
θ + 2
= 4E
[
C
[
Φ
(
log (biw)− x′iwβ
exp (x′iwσ)
)
,Φ
(
log (bjw)− x′jwβ
exp
(
x′jwσ
) )]]− 1 i 6= j (5)
where Φ (·) is the standard normal CDF.
The last set of moment conditions are used to identify the parameters of the unobserved bid-preparation
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cost distribution. These moment conditions are
E [nmw] =
∫
NmwpmwdF (xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw) , (6)
E
[
n2mw
]
=
∫
Nmwpmw (1− pmw) +N2mwp2mwdF (xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw) , (7)
E
[
n3mw
]
=
∫
Nmwpmw
(
1− 3pmw + 3Nmwpmw + 2p2mw − 3Nmwp2mw (8)
+ N2mwp
2
mw
)
dF (xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw) ,
and
E
[
n4mw
]
=
∫
Nmwpmw
(
1− 7pmw + 7Nmwpmw + 12p2mw − 18Nnwp2mw + 6N2mwp2mw (9)
− 6p3mw + 11Nmwp3mw − 6N2mwp3mw +N3mwp3mw
)
dF (xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw)
where
pmw = G
m
k (Π (xw, Nmw, N−mw) | zw)
is the group-specific entry probability. These moment conditions are derived from the assumption that entry
is dictated by a joint binomial distribution where the probabilities bidders assign to entry is consistent with
the actual entry probabilities.
5.4 Parametric Identification
Given that part of the estimation strategy aims to measure affiliation, it is suitable to briefly discuss how
the affiliation parameter is identified from the data. In that light, there are two pathways through which
the affiliation parameter is identified in estimation. The first pathway is through the dependence of bids
as measured by Kendall’s tau; if the observed bids tend to be positively dependent conditional on the
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observables, then the model will attribute that dependence to the affiliation parameter. The second pathway
is through the entry probabilities of firms, specifically through the computation of the ex-ante profits in the
entry probabilities. These profits represent the expected benefit from entering the auction and are subject to
change depending on the degree of affiliation between project-completion costs. Changing the ex-ante profits
will therefore change the entry probability of firms, aiding in the identification of the affiliation parameter.
6 Empirical Results
This section presents the empirical findings from the NMDOT highway procurement data. Descriptive
summary statistics and reduced-form regressions are first shown to highlight some of the main patterns in
the data relevant to residency status and firm bidding and entry behavior. Next, the structural parameter
estimates from the empirical model are displayed and interpreted. These estimates suggest affiliation among
bidder project-completion costs and higher entry costs for resident firms relative to non-resident firms.
6.1 Summary Statistics
Table 1: Summary Statistics for New Mexico Highway Construction Projects
Federal-Aid Projects State Projects All Projects
Number of Contracts 353.00 23.00 376.00
Average Bid (in 1000s) 4068.05 5469.58 4156.93
Average Engineer’s Estimate (in 1000s) 3679.79 4628.75 3737.84
Average Resident Planholders 9.50 9.91 9.52
Average Resident Bidders 2.97 3.39 3.00
Average Non-Resident Planholders 2.34 2.22 2.33
Average Non-Resident Bidders 1.17 0.91 1.15
Fraction of Projects by Type of Road:
Federal Highway 0.59 0.52 0.59
Other Road 0.41 0.48 0.41
Fraction of Projects by Type of Work:
Road Work 0.61 0.52 0.60
Bridge Work 0.20 0.09 0.19
Other Work 0.20 0.39 0.21
Table 1 contains the summary statistics for all highway procurement contracts in the sample tabulated
by the source of funding. For each auction, the following project characteristics are observed: an engineer’s
estimated cost, the number of projected working days, the nature and location of the work, the number
of licenses required, the length in miles, and the number of bidders and planholders. Additionally, the
17
number of subprojects19 are observed as well as any Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) subcontracting
requirements. Residency status and entry decisions are observed at the firm level.
The top panel of table 1 summarizes the average estimated cost, bid, number of potential entrants, and
number of actual entrants. Relative to federal-aid projects, state-funded projects are slightly larger and more
expensive on average. The average estimated cost across state-funded projects exceeds that of federal-aid
projects by about $949, 000, while the bids received on state-funded projects are about $1, 401, 000 higher
than the bids received on federal-aid projects. Across the potential and actual entrant dimensions, federal-aid
and state-funded projects are similar, attracting around the same average number of resident and non-resident
planholders and bidders.
The remaining portion of table 1 separates state and federal aid projects by the type of road and the
nature of the work requested. The nature of work is separated into three mutually exclusive categories: road
work, bridge work, and other work. State and federal-aid projects are similar in terms of their location;
roughly 50 − 60 percent of work is conducted on federal highways. State and federal-aid projects differ,
however, in the nature of the work requested. Relative to federal-aid projects, state-funded projects require
less road and bridge work while work falling into neither of these categories is relatively higher.
6.2 Descriptive Regressions
In order to understand the different bidding patterns in the data, a descriptive difference-in-differences
regression analysis is performed on the log bids of all entering firms. This regression takes the form
log (biw) = β1NMw + β2RESIDENTi + β3NMw ×RESIDENTi + ψ′Xw + iw
where biw is the submitted bid for firm i in auction w, NMw is an indicator variable that takes on a value
of one if the project is state-funded, RESIDENTi is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if the
bidder qualifies for resident preferences, and Xw is a vector of project characteristics.
20 The error terms, iw,
account for clustering at the project level in order to allow for auction level correlations across bids. Here
the main object of interest in this specification is the sum of the β2 and β3 parameters; this sum captures
the difference in how resident and non-resident firms bid in a preference auction holding all other observables
constant.
19A subproject is a smaller portion of the main project. For example, if a roadway rehabilitation project requires the
installation of a fence, the fence installation would be a subproject of the main roadway rehabilitation project.
20Consistent with the theoretical assumptions, this regression does not address selection. To see why, note the model takes
entry costs and project-completion costs as draws from independent distributions. Since ex-ante profits and entry costs do not
depend on the realized project-completion cost, the bidding decision is independent of the entry decision.
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The bid regression is further separated into three distinctive specifications – each allowing for a different
number of fixed effects. The first regression specification has no fixed effects, while the second specification
allows for month, year, and district fixed effects. These fixed effects account for monthly and yearly trends in
the data as well as differences across administrative districts. The final specification includes contract fixed
effects as a means of controlling for unobserved project heterogeneity.
Table 2: OLS Regression on Bids
Dependent variable:
log(Bid)
(1) (2) (3)
Resident −0.019∗∗ −0.019∗∗ −0.021∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
New Mexico Project −0.151∗∗ −0.158∗∗
(0.068) (0.068)
log(Engineer’s Estimate) 0.933∗∗∗ 0.930∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.018)
log(Working Days) 0.054∗∗ 0.042∗
(0.021) (0.023)
Urban −0.068∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗
(0.017) (0.023)
Number of Licenses Required 0.022 0.028∗
(0.017) (0.017)
log(Length+1) (in miles) 0.021 0.024
(0.015) (0.015)
DBE Goal (%) −0.006 −0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
log(Subprojects) 0.038∗ 0.040∗
(0.023) (0.024)
Federal Highway −0.013 −0.028
(0.018) (0.017)
Resident × NM Project 0.116∗ 0.115∗ 0.112∗∗
(0.065) (0.064) (0.050)
District/Month/Year FEs X
Project FEs X
Observations 1,561 1,561 1,561
Adjusted R2 0.974 0.976 0.986
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Descriptive OLS regressions of the submitted bids.
Each regression specification has controls for the type
of work requested, the number of resident and non-
resident bidders, and the number of resident and
non-resident planholders. Errors are clustered at the
project level.
The results from each regression specification are reported in table 2. The first column indicates that
residents bid 9.7 percent higher than non-residents on state-funded projects conditional on the observables.
As additional fixed effects are added in columns 2 and 3, this effect diminishes slightly but remains more
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or less the same, decreasing to 9.6 percent with the addition of month, year, and district fixed effects and
9.1 percent with the addition of contract fixed effects. A caveat to this finding, though, is that some of
these reduced-form differences in bidding patterns could also be attributed to differences in how residents
and non-residents bid on state-funded projects independent of how bids are discounted. Without additional
variation in the preference level, it is difficult to evaluate these other sources of variation without relying on
the theoretical implications of the empirical model.
In order to analyze potential differences in entry behavior, a probit regression is estimated as a model
of a firm’s entry decision. The dependent variable is the decision of a firm to enter an auction, and project
characteristics as well as the number of resident and non-resident planholders are included as covariates.
As with the bid regression, the entry regression is separated into three specifications. Relative to the first
specification, the second specification includes additional controls for the location of the project as well as
controls for the month and year the project was awarded. These additional controls account for changes in
entry due to a project’s location and award date. The third specification consists of project-level dummies
to the address project-specific entry differences. In all three specifications, the errors account for clustering
at the project level.
Table 3: Entry Regression
Dependent variable:
Entry
(1) (2) (3)
Resident −0.202∗∗∗ −0.204∗∗∗ −0.211∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
New Mexico Project −0.056 −0.072
(0.065) (0.065)
Resident × NM Project 0.092 0.113 0.102
(0.080) (0.081) (0.087)
District/Month/Year Effects X
Project Effects X
Observations 4,456 4,456 4,456
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The table reports the marginal effects from a pro-
bit model of bidder entry decisions. All regression
specifications have controls for the project char-
acteristics, resident and non-resident planholders,
and the type of work requested. Errors are clus-
tered at the project level.
The marginal effects of the probit regression are reported in table 3. The marginal effects suggest that,
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across all three specifications, residents have a lower propensity to enter auctions relative to non-residents
conditional on attaining planholder status. Residents have an increased propensity to enter when the auction
is a preference auction relative to a non-preference auction, though. The theoretical model provides two
explanations for these lower resident entry rates: either residents have lower expected profits for participating
in a project, or residents have higher bid-preparation costs. Given that ex-ante profits and entry costs are
not observed in the data, it is tough to judge the relative influence of these separate explanations.
6.3 Structural Estimates
The estimated empirical model is used to disentangle strategic participation and bidding decisions. Both
preference and non-preference auctions are used in estimation, but projects with 20 or more planholders are
dropped for computational reasons – amounting to 1 state-funded project and 10 federally-funded projects. In
order to mitigate the effect of unobserved project heterogeneity on submitted bids, the number of potential
entrants in each group are used in the set of control variables. The idea behind these controls is that
unobservable project characteristics may attract more potential entrants, which is reflected in the number of
planholders for each project. A rich set of project controls are also used so that the correlation in submitted
bids is primarily generated through affiliation in costs as opposed to unobserved project characteristics that
are common knowledge to the bidders.
Table 4 contains the parameter estimates for the bid distribution. The difference in the log bids of
residents and non residents is found to be small and statistically insignificant; residents only bid 1 percent
less than non-residents across procurement projects. Conversely, the affiliation parameter estimate is positive
and statistically significant, which indicates the presence of affiliation in firm project-completion costs.
In order to evaluate differences in the marginal resident and non-resident project-completion costs, meth-
ods of bid inversion developed by GPV (2000) are used on the estimated bid distributions. These methods
use the equilibrium bid distributions in conjunction with the first-order conditions on optimal bidding to back
out the cost associated with an observed bid. Heterogeneity in project characteristics will result in different
marginal cost distributions for each separate project in the data. To keep the analysis concise, resident and
non-resident marginal cost distributions are calculated for two types of projects: one project with the average
characteristics of a preference project and one project with the average characteristics of a non-preference
project. For each of these projects, bids are simulated from the estimated marginal bid distributions and
inverted to obtain costs using the average number of resident and non-resident bidders as the number of
participants and taking into account the estimated affiliation parameter. The marginal cost distribution is
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Table 4: Estimated Parameters for the Log-Bid Distribution
Coefficient Standard Error
Constant 0.849 0.175
Resident -0.011 0.011
New Mexico project -0.034 0.069
log(Engineer’s Estimate) 0.913 0.020
log(Length+1) (in miles) 0.038 0.015
log(Working Days) 0.070 0.023
Resident Planholders 0.001 0.004
Non-Resident Planholders -0.005 0.007
Bridge Work -0.021 0.033
Road Work -0.0001 0.034
Number of Licenses Required 0.013 0.019
Federal Highway -0.004 0.021
Urban -0.044 0.018
DBE Goal(%) -0.008 0.004
log(Subprojects) 0.077 0.025
Standard Deviation Parameters
Constant 0.697 0.325
Resident 0.263 0.707
log(Engineer’s Estimate) -0.180 0.030
Affiliation Parameter
Theta 0.831 0.189
Note : Standard deviation of the bid distribution is estimated as
σ = exp(b0 + b1resident+ b2engineer) where resident is an
indicator for being a resident bidder and engineer is the log of
the enginner’s estimate.
estimated non-parametrically with a kernel density estimator, yielding a marginal cost CDF for both types
of bidders.
Figure 1 displays the different marginal project-completion cost CDFs for the average preference and
non-preference project. As evidenced by the shape of the CDFs and consistent with the observed marginal
bid distributions, residents have a more disperse cost distribution than non-residents across projects. Also,
no one cost distribution first order stochastically dominates the other in any of the average projects, which
can lead to ambiguity in the ranking of resident and non-resident firms in terms of cost efficiency.
Turning to firm entry costs, table 5 presents the estimated parameters for the log-normal entry cost
distribution. The entry parameters have the expected signs and magnitudes although some of the parameters
are statistically insignificant due to high standard errors relative to the bid distribution parameters. The
entry parameters suggest noticeable differences among resident and non-resident costs of entry. Residents
have higher average entry costs compared to non-residents and more variation in these entry costs.21 A
21Recall that these parameter estimates are the mean and variance of the natural logarithm of bids. The mean of the actual
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Figure 1: Kernel Density Estimates of the Marginal Cost CDFs for the Average Preference and Non-
Preference Auctions
Table 5: Estimated Parameters for the Log-Entry Cost Distribution
Coefficient Standard Error
Constant -0.121 0.800
log(Engineer’s Estimate) 0.565 0.757
Resident 2.256 0.410
Resident Planholders 0.228 0.994
Non-Resident Planholders 0.109 0.244
Standard Deviation Parameters
Constant -0.589 0.190
Resident 1.854 0.301
Note : Standard deviation of the entry distribution is estimated as
α = exp(b0 + b1resident) where resident is an indicator for being
a resident bidder.
plausible explanation for these differences is that there may be a separate entry process into planholder
status that selects non-resident firms who have innately lower bid-preparation costs, which is outside the
scope of the data and model. The parameter estimates are nonetheless consistent with the lower conversion
rate of potential resident bidders into actual bidders observed in the data.
distribution of bids is calculated as exp
(
µ+ σ
2
2
)
while the variance is
(
exp
(
σ2
)− 1) exp (2µ+ σ2) where µ is the mean of the
natural logarithm of the bids and σ is the standard deviation of the natural logarithm of the bids.
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7 Counterfactual Analysis
This section contains counterfactual policy experiments using the structural parameter estimates from section
6.3. Given the computational burden associated with calculating equilibrium bid functions, the counterfac-
tual section focuses on a representative construction project qualifying for preference in the data.22 This
section first explores how affiliation and bid preferences affect bidding under fixed participation; then, bidder
responses to different discount levels are compared under the estimated level of affiliation and independence,
allowing for endogenous entry decisions.
A number of steps are taken to simulate counterfactual bidding and entry behavior. First, the underlying
marginal project-completion cost distributions, FRc and F
NR
c , are estimated nonparametrically by inverting
a large number of bids drawn from the bid distribution implied by the empirical model using GPV (2000).23
These group-specific cost distributions are primitives of the model and are fixed across all counterfactual
policies and affiliation levels. Next, the equilibrium inverse bid functions are estimated and inverted using
a modified version of the third algorithm found in Bajari (2001), which essentially approximates inverse
bid functions using polynomials.24 The estimated bid functions and project-completion cost distributions
together with the entry cost distributions determine ex-ante profits, and, when entry is endogenous, the
entry decisions are simulated given the entry cost draws and the group-specific ex-ante profits. For entrants,
project-completion costs are drawn from an affiliated distribution using methods described in Marshall and
Olkin (1988), and the bid functions are applied to the costs to determine the counterfactual bids. For the
auction simulations across discount levels, the number of potential entrants is set to the average preference
auction level of 10 resident and 2 non-resident bidders, but the simulated number of entrants can vary given
draws of the entry costs. A total of 1, 000 auctions are simulated for each grid point in a grid of preferences
to generate the outcomes across discount levels.
7.1 Affiliation, Bid Preferences, and Optimal Bidding
As a first step in understanding how affiliation interacts with bid preferences, the numerical methods are
used to approximate bid functions under fixed participation and varying degrees of preference and cost
22To construct this project, the average of all numerical observables on projects qualifying for preference are taken as the
representative project characteristics. For categorical variables, the most common category is used as the representative category.
23Note that the marginal project-completion cost distribution will depend on the number of bidders and must be truncated
to be consistent with the theory. Following Athey et al. (2013), a common configuration of three resident entrants and one non-
resident entrant is used to determine the marginal project-completion cost distribution. To deal with truncation, the support
of the nonparametric project-completion cost distribution is truncated to an interval large enough to contain 10, 000 randomly
generated project-completion costs, corresponding to an interval with lower bound $1, 851, 500 and upper bound $9, 257, 500 for
the representative construction project.
24See the appendix for a detailed explanation of how the bid functions are estimated
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dependence. The bid functions use the cost distributions and average number of participants associated
with the representative preference contract, comparing bids under the estimated affiliation parameter with
counterfactual bids under independence. To investigate the impact of bid preferences, bid functions are
further compared across auctions with the 5 percent preference policy and auctions without any preference.
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Figure 2: Bid Functions under Fixed Participation (nR = 3, nNR = 1)
Figure 2 presents the equilibrium bid functions. There are a couple of changes affiliation in project-
completion costs introduces into procurement auctions with bid preferences relative to independent project-
completion costs. One change is that affiliation causes bidders to bid more aggressively for low project-
completion cost draws and less aggressively for high project-completion cost draws independent of the level
of preference. The intuition here is that when a bidder draws a low project-completion cost in an auction
with affiliation, other bidders are more likely to draw low project-completion costs, implying that bidding
should be more aggressive. The same logic can be applied to a high project-completion cost draw in that
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bidding should be less aggressive in an auction with affiliation since other bidders are more likely to have
drawn high project-completion costs. Affiliation also changes the difference between how preferred and non-
preferred bidders submit bids in preference auctions. Bid preferences drive a wedge between preferred and
non-preferred bidders, meaning that preferred bidders bid more with the same project-completion cost than
a non-preferred bidder with the same cost. Affiliation accentuates this difference for most project-completion
cost draws since these costs are more likely to be similar.
7.2 Alternative Discount Rates
Although New Mexico offers a 5 percent discount for its resident bidders, the discount level for preferred
bidders can vary across states and the type of good being procured. Different discount levels will have different
implications for the participation and bidding behavior of firms, and these changes in behavior are investigated
for the representative construction project using the structural parameter estimates in conjunction with the
project-completion cost distribution estimates.
Figure 3 shows the how the procurement cost, the fraction of preferred winners, and the expected par-
ticipation changes across affiliation and preference levels. Increasing the discount level increases the average
procurement cost in these preference auctions. Specifically, an increase in the discount rate from 0 percent to
its current level of 5 percent increases the average procurement cost of the representative construction project
by 1.8 percent under affiliation. This increase is less than the 6 percent increase in procurement costs that
comes from affiliation at the current discount level relative to independence. Also, affiliation leads to a lower
expected participation rate of both groups of bidders, which can explain the higher average procurement
costs. Despite the lower overall participation, though, affiliation results in a higher proportion of resident
winners across all counterfactual discount levels relative to independence. A higher proportion of resident
winners is also a result of increasing the discount level under the estimated level of affiliation.
Taken together, these simulations suggest that the discount rate can be used as a mechanism to increase
the proportion of contracts won by resident bidders at the expense of higher procurement costs. Relative to
the independence case, affiliation leads to higher expected procurement costs, a higher proportion of resident
winners, and lower expected participation. These differences illustrate the significance of affiliation in public
procurement.
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Figure 3: Average Winning Bid, Fraction of Resident Winners, and Entry under Alternative Discount Rates
8 Conclusion
This paper empirically examines the presence of affiliation and its effect on procurement auctions in an
environment where bid discounts are offered to preferred bidders. The focus of the analysis is on NMDOT
construction contracts – a unique environment where resident bidders receive a 5 percent discount over non-
resident bidders in construction contracts that use state funds. For the purpose of measuring affiliation and
its effect on procurement, a two-stage theoretical model is developed where firms with potentially affiliated
private project-completion costs first decide entry and then decide how much to bid. The theoretical model
is empirically implemented through the use of copulas, capturing affiliation through a tractable parametric
assumption on the project-completion cost distribution. A descriptive reduced-form analysis on bids and
entry decisions is then used to investigate any possible differences in bidding and entry behavior between
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resident and non-resident bidders, and the model is estimated via GMM to disentangle these two separate
decisions.
The structural analysis establishes the presence of affiliation and demonstrates the importance of affiliation
in these procurement auctions. The parameter that measures affiliation is found to be positive and significant,
indicating that firms have affiliated project-completion costs. Counterfactual policy simulations reveal that
affiliation lowers the participation rate of preferred and non-preferred bidders in preference auctions and
results in a 6 percent increase in procurement costs. In contrast, New Mexico’s current policy is only
responsible for a 1.8 percent increase in procurement cost.
In line with how the NMDOT awards preferences on its procurement auctions, this paper focuses on the
interaction of affiliation and a particular type of preference policy where bid discounts are offered to preferred
bidders. An interesting research direction for the future would be to explore how affiliation acts in settings
where other types of preference policies are used such as group-specific entry fees and reserve prices. The
investigation of these other settings is left to future research.
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A Applying GPV to Auctions with Bid Preferences and Affiliation
The first order conditions in equation 1 can be rewritten as follows:
30
c1 = b1 −
S1
[
1− Fm1c (c1) , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, . . . , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
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)
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(
β−1R
)]
∂S1[1−Fm1c (c1),1−FNRc (β−1NR),...,1−FNRc (β−1NR),1−FRc (β−1R ),...,1−FRc (β−1R )]
∂b1
(10)
where
∂S1[1−Fm1c (c1),1−FNRc (β−1NR),...,1−FNRc (β−1NR),1−FRc (β−1R ),...,1−FRc (β−1R )]
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(
β−1NR
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×S12
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1− Fm1c (c1) , 1− FNRc
(
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)
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+ (nR −DR)β−1R,1 (1− δ)−DNR fRc
(
β−1R
)
×S1n
[
1− Fm1c (c1) , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, . . . , 1− FNRc
(
β−1NR
)
, 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)
, . . . , 1− FRc
(
β−1R
)]
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Define b˜ = (1− δ)DR b as the adjusted resident bid and bˆ = (1− δ)−DNR b as the adjusted non-resident
bid. These adjusted bids are the bids from the competing group that the bidder calculating the optimal
bid faces. Following the methodology outlined in GPV (2000), the marginal CDF and PDF of costs can be
expressed solely as functions of the bids by noting that
FNRb
(
b˜
)
= FNRc
(
β−1NR
(
b˜
))
FRb
(
bˆ
)
= FRc
(
β−1R
(
bˆ
))
and
fNRb
(
b˜
)
= fNRc
(
β−1NR
(
b˜
))
β−1NR,1
(
b˜
)
fRb
(
bˆ
)
= fNRc
(
β−1R
(
bˆ
))
β−1R,1
(
bˆ
)
.
Equation 10 can now be written as
c1 = b1 −
S1
[
1− Fm1b (b1) , 1− FNRb
(
b˜1
)
, . . . , 1− FNRb
(
b˜1
)
, 1− FRb
(
bˆ1
)
, . . . , 1− FRb
(
bˆ1
)]
∂S1[1−Fm1b (b1),1−FNRb (b˜1),...,1−FNRb (b˜1),1−FRb (bˆ1),...,1−FRb (bˆ1)]
∂b1
which expresses costs as the sum of the bid and a strategic markdown.
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B Solving for the Inverse Bid Functions
In order to solve for the inverse bid functions, a modified version of the third algorithm found in Bajari
(2001) is implemented. In particular, suppose that the equilibrium inverse bid functions for bidders in group
m ∈ {R,NR} can be approximated by the following flexible functional form:
βˆ−1m (b) = b+
K∑
k=0
αm,k (b− b)k
where b is the unknown common low bid and {αm,k} , k = 0, . . . ,K are polynomial coefficients for bidders
in group m. The first order conditions can now be expressed in terms of the polynomial approximations. Let
α be a vector that collects the polynomial coefficients of all groups of bidders, βˆ−1NR = βˆ
−1
NR
(
(1− δ)DR b
)
,
βˆ−1R = βˆ
−1
R
(
(1− δ)−DNR b
)
, and define Gm (b; b,α) as the first order conditions with the approximated
inverse bid functions set equal to 0 at b:
Gm (b; b,α) =
S1
[
1− Fmc
(
βˆ−1m
)
, 1− FNRc
(
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(
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.
These first order conditions are evaluated at T evenly-spaced grid points within the intervals b ∈
[
b
(1−δ) , b
]
for residents and b ∈ [b, (1− δ) b] for non-residents. Here, b is determined by the number of resident bidders:
b = c if nR > 1 and b = arg maxb [(b− c) Pr ((1− δ) b < bj ∀j ∈ NR | c)] if nR = 1. In order to capture the
flat spot in the inverse bid functions, non-residents who have costs c ∈ [(1− δ) b, c] are assumed to bid their
cost. Taken together, the modified boundary conditions are
0 = βˆ−1R
(
b
(1− δ)
)
− c
0 = βˆ−1NR (b)− c
0 = βˆ−1R
(
b
)− c
0 = βˆ−1NR
(
(1− δ) b)− (1− δ) c
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Define H (b;α) as
H (b;α) =
∑
m
T∑
t=1
Gm (bt; b,α) + T
(
βˆ−1R
(
b
(1− δ)
)
− c
)
+ T
(
βˆ−1NR (b)− c
)
+ T
(
βˆ−1R
(
b
)− c)+ T (βˆ−1NR ((1− δ) b)− (1− δ) c)
Approximating the inverse bid functions is equivalent to finding a vector of polynomial coefficients αˆ to
minimize H (b;α). Note that T is used as a weight so that the minimization routine gives equal consideration
to boundary conditions and the first-order conditions.
C Estimation Method
The parameters of the model are estimated via GMM which essentially matches the predictions of the empir-
ical model to the moments of the data. This matching process requires assumptions on the bid distribution
and bid-preparation cost distribution which were outlined in section 5.2. For completeness, these assumptions
are given below:
log (biw) = x
′
iwβ + 
mi
iw
miiw | xiw ∼ N
(
0, exp (x′iwσ)
2
)
(
NR1w , . . . , 
NR
nNRw, 
R
nNR+1w, . . . , 
R
nNR+nRw | xiw
)
≡ w ∼ Fw
Fw = C
[
FNR1w , . . . , FNRnNRw
, FRnNR+1
, . . . , FRnNR+nR
]
log (kiw) = z
′
iwγ + u
mi
iw
umiw | ziw ∼ N
(
0, exp (z′iwα)
2
)
.
The first and second moment conditions are derived from the first and second moments of the bidding
distribution:
E [xiw (log (biw)− x′iwβ)] = E [E [xiw (log (biw)− x′iwβ) | xiw]]
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= E [xiwE [(log (biw)− x′iwβ) | xiw]] = E [xiwE [iw | xiw]] = 0
and
E [xiw (log (biw)− x′iwβ) (log (biw)− x′iwβ)] =
E [xiwE [(log (biw)− x′iwβ) (log (biw)− x′iwβ) | xiw]] =
E
[
xiwE
[
2iw | xiw
]]
= E
[
xiw exp (x
′
iwσ)
2
]
.
The corresponding empirical moments are
1
W
W∑
w=1
1
nRw + nNRw
nRw+nNRw∑
i=1
[xiw (log (biw)− x′iwβ)]
for the first moment and
1
W
W∑
w=1
1
nRw + nNRw
nRw+nNRw∑
i=1
[
xiw
(
log (biw)
2 − (x′iwβ)2 − exp (x′iwσ)2
)]
for the second moment.
The next moment condition is derived from the equation for Kendall’s tau for Clayton copulas. In
particular, when the dependence between random variables can be modeled as a copula, Kendall’s tau takes
the following form:
τij = 4E
[
C
[
F iu (ui) , F
j
u (uj)
]]− 1 (11)
where τij is Kendall’s tau, and ui and uj are random variables that are related through the copula C[·, ·]
with marginal distributions F iu and F
j
u respectively. Given the assumption that the copula is a Clayton
copula, the equation for Kendall’s tau has a closed-form solution:
τij =
θ
θ + 2
. (12)
Combining equations 11 and 12 gives the next moment condition which can be expressed as
θ
θ + 2
= 4E
[
C
[
Φ
(
log (biw)− x′iwβ
exp (x′iwσ)
)
,Φ
(
log (bjw)− x′jwβ
exp
(
x′jwσ
) )]]− 1 i 6= j,
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and the empirical counterpart for the above moment condition is
4
W
W∑
w=1
1 nRw + nNRw
2

∑
1≤i<j≤nRw+nNRw
C
[
Φ
(
log (biw)− x′iwβ
exp (x′iwσ)
)
,Φ
(
log (bjw)− x′jwβ
exp
(
x′jwσ
) )]
−1− θ
θ + 2
.
There is one subtlety in the above equation. The equation for τij (equation 11) is given for copulas with
two random variables, yet many auctions require that bids be drawn from copulas with three or more random
variables. In response to this requirement, the above equation first takes averages over all combinations of
pairs of bids in an auction then averages over all auctions in order to use all of the information in the sample.
In other words, for each auction the average Kendall’s tau is taken for each possible pair of bids and use that
average when computing the empirical moment condition.
The final set of moment conditions are derived from the moments of the entry distribution. Given that
entry is assumed to follow a binomial distribution, the first, second, third and fourth moments of the entry
distribution given the number of potential entrants and project characteristics are
E [nmw | xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw] = Nmwpmw,
E
[
n2mw | xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw
]
= Nmwpmw (1− pmw) +N2mwp2mw,
E
[
n3mw | xw, zw, Nmw, N−mw
]
= Nmwpmw
(
1− 3pmw + 3Nmwpmw + 2p2mw − 3Nmwp2mw +N2mwp2mw
)
,
and
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[
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1− 7pmw + 7Nmwpmw + 12p2mw − 18Nnwp2mw + 6N2mwp2mw
− 6p3mw + 11Nmwp3mw − 6N2mwp3mw +N3mwp3mw
)
respectively. Taking unconditional expectations over the number of potential entrants and the project
characteristics yields the moment conditions described in section 5.3. These moment conditions are
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The corresponding empirical moments are then given by
1
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w=1
[nmw −Nmwpmw] ,
1
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,
36
1W
W∑
w=1
[
n3mw −Nmwpmw
(
1− 3pmw + 3Nmwpmw + 2p2mw − 3Nmwp2mw +N2mwp2mw
)]
,
and
1
W
W∑
w=1
[
n4mw − Nmwpmw
(
1− 7pmw + 7Nmwpmw + 12p2mw − 18Nnwp2mw + 6N2mwp2mw
− 6p3mw + 11Nmwp3mw − 6N2mwp3mw +N3mwp3mw
)]
D Additional Figures
37
38
